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This article examines the tipping point of  the Euro crisis as a turning point for EU integration 
processes. First, I introduce the concept of  securitization and its usefulness to grasp breaches within 
the constitutional order. I then define the concept of  ‘crisis’ around which this article revolves. A 
contextualization of  the Spanish bail-out and the ECB’s intervention of  mid-2012 follows. 
Before moving on to the results of  the analysis, brief  methodological comments are made. Reading 
the episode at hand through the discourses of  a variegated sample of  political actors provides 
hindsight into its complexity. While newspapers’ discursive strategy fits the concept, Rajoy and 
Draghi’s interventions defy the logic of  securitization by acting extraordinarily while denying 
threats and their own exceptional behavior. 
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This article focuses on a crucial episode of  the Euro crisis to discuss its 
implications in terms of  constitutionality and exceptionalism. From early 2010 on-
ward, speculation on structural governmental debt triggered devaluation spirals af-
fecting the whole eurozone (Kutter 2014). These speculative pressures were closely 
tied to EU authorities’ incapacity to provide a satisfactory resolution to the 2008 
global financial crisis. Spain’s bailout in 2012 didn’t prevent speculation on the Euro 
to keep building up. It was only with Mario Draghi’s unexpected intervention that 
fears declined – as he claimed that ‘the ECB will do whatever it takes to preserve the 
Euro’. This episode has been identified by numerous observers as the episode during 
which the Euro crisis culminated (Hodson 2013; Holmes 2014). 
 This episode is all the more relevant when considering the subsequent 
constitutional reforms to the architecture of  European governance that were 
undertaken (Kutter 2014). These steps were taken on an extra-legal basis and through 
quasi autocratic procedures challenging founding principles of  the EU, such as the 
equality of  member states, democratic control, etc. (White 2015). Of  course, EU 
enlargement has always been the result of  ad hoc bargaining processes, challenging 
the notion of  a well-established juridical framework for negotiation. Since its early 
days, the EU regime of  enlargement policy corresponds with a technocratic working 
ethos and a paternalistic approach (Kutter & Trappmann 2010). Nonetheless, the 
integrative steps done under crisis management represent a deviation from the 
European ‘legal normalcy’ that have blended into a permanent configuration of  
authority (Kreuder-Sonnen 2016). That which before the Euro crisis needed to be 
accomplished through exceptional measures has now been constitutionalized, 
implying that what was previously labeled as extraordinary action was turned into 
normal politics. The blurring out of  constitutional restraints to executive rule poses 
a theoretical problem by changing the normative coordinates with which to assess the 
democratic character of  our societies (Agamben 2004). 
 The first section will introduce the concept of  securitization used in this pa-
per. Indeed, the appearance and/or construction of  an emergency situation 
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constitutes the core justification for exceptional measures (Buzan et al. 1998, 23). As 
the case study consists of  a crisis episode, the second section suggests that ‘crises’ are 
a defining feature of  our societies. Crisis-related threat production gives us the op-
portunity to study how exceptionality operates, as it becomes visible in the media. As 
such, this article focuses on the episode with which speculation on the Euro was 
brought to a grinding halt by enacting constitutional reform avant la lettre. The fourth 
section provides an overview of  the Euro crisis. I then explain the methodology, 
share the results and conclude with some final remarks about eurozone exceptionality. 
 
2. Securitization and exceptionality 
Buzan, Waever and de Wilde coined the concept of  securitization to desig-
nate a process by which certain political decisions are no longer bound to standard 
procedures responding to an alleged exceptional situation. As such, security studies 
are a useful framework of  analysis to describe governmental threat management. Suc-
cessful securitization brings the issue into the realm of  security, in which decisions 
are no longer subject to the scrutiny of  parliamentary deliberation (Buzan et al. 1998). 
Conversely, desecuritization means that a certain issue returns to regular parliamen-
tary politics. Securitization is not a static nor universal category: issues can become 
‘‘desecuritized’’ or ‘‘resecuritized’’ over time (Hansen 2012).1 Engaging with Carl 
Schmitt’s work (Schmitt 1985, 2014), securitization studies’ have criticized the falla-
cious legitimation of  exceptional political action (Angelov 2012; Williams 2003).2 
The anti-democratic implications of  exceptionality lie at the heart of  the 
security realm, defined by state secret (Kreuder-Sonnen 2018). If  the decision-making 
process implied by parliamentary systems is made public, strategic and tactical 
 
1 Securitization scholars have argued thoroughly that securitization processes require the adherence of  
the audience in order to successfully elevate certain issues to the realm of  security. The assessment of  
the effects of  the discourses under study on the population fall outside of  the scope of  this article, in 
which I discuss whether these discourses can be fruitfully captured by the concept of  securitization. 
2 Securitization relates to the Schmittian concept of  sovereignty, according to which the sovereign is 
the person ‘who decides on the exception’ (Schmitt 1985). When Schmitt refers to the exception, he 
means the state of  exception, that consists in suspending the law (in liberal regimes, the constitution) 
to protect the law.  
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efficiency is compromised. In other words, the enemy should not have the oppor-
tunity to know one’s strategy beforehand. However, securitization studies observed 
that, once the Cold War ended, securitization processes were no longer only tied to 
the military sector, and indeed spread to other sectors of  society, such as the eco-
nomic sector, the political sector, the ecological sector, and alike (Buzan et al. 1998; 
Gross 1999). In fact, since the fall of  the Berlin wall, securitization processes have 
been extended to issues such as immigration, disease control, natural catastrophes, 
etc. (Karyotis & Patrikios 2010; McInnes & Rushton 2013; Baele & Sterck 2015; 
Ejdus & Božović 2017). 
The concept of  securitization could seldom be properly applied to eco-
nomic events, as the bankruptcy of  companies is a part of  the normal functioning of  
capitalist competition. Relative economic insecurity is seen as pushing actors towards 
efficiency, making it hard to label failures as extraordinary. As such, the identification 
of  existential threats around the economic sector usually finds its justification in the 
consequences that these economic problems could have in other sectors. As the Co-
penhagen School (CS) points out, ‘the major exceptions even for liberal governments 
are very large manufacturing firms and especially banks, whose collapse would 
threaten the stability of  the entire economy and, in the case of  banks, possibly the 
stability of  the international financial system’ (Buzan et al. 1998, 100-101). This sort 
of  events relates to the concept of  economic state of  emergency, a specific sort of  
exceptionalism roughly characterized as a bypassing of  normal technical and bureau-
cratic processes to face up to extremely fast and complex financial dynamics (Best 
2017; Atiles-Osoria 2018). 
The financial collapse of  the 2008 sub-prime crisis fits the concept of  secu-
ritization: the alleged threats are straightforward and their definition lacks ambiguity; 
the measures to counter them are simple and are expected to solve the problem (De-
belle dos Santos 2013). The difference between the exception and the norm is well-
defined, and the competent authority in each case justifies its actions by appealing to 
a concrete exception. Specific events justify extraordinary measures that are to be 
applied only for a limited amount of  time (Buzan et al. 1998). Securitization has a 
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straightforward heuristic capacity to describe this sort of  exceptionalism, as excep-
tional measures are explicitly defined as responses to extraordinary circumstances. 
Yet, researchers diverge about how the eurozone crisis fits the concept. For 
Langenohl’s (2017, 139), the eurozone crisis lent itself  much closer to ‘classical’ secu-
ritization, because the crisis was framed in terms of  defaulting states, not defaulting 
banks’. On the contrary, Abulof  (2014, 400) considers that the ‘existential threshold’ 
of  the eurozone crisis is rather limited in scale and scope. These debates attest that, 
as the 2008 crisis settled in, securitization processes became harder to track. Threats 
are more elusive, the periods over which they operate expand, and extraordinary 
measures are no longer the object of  discussion  (Debelle dos Santos 2017). It thus 
matters to take a closer look at the meaning of  crisis and its relationship with excep-
tionality. 
 
3. From crisis as exception to ‘state of crisis’ 
Broadly speaking, the last decade shook the foundations of  the relatively 
stable world system described by securitization studies. In line with these 
considerations, contemporary societies are best described as being subsumed in a 
‘state of  crisis’ (Rodrigues dos Santos 2001; Baumann & Bordoni 2014). This has 
implied new governance techniques that have been alternatively labeled as ‘neoliberal 
authoritarianism’ (Bruff  2014), ‘liberal exceptionalism’ (Best 2017), ‘authoritarian 
constitutionalism’ (Oberndorfer 2020), or ‘ordo-liberal constitutionalism’ (White 
2015). The present article focuses on the latter, although generally drawing from this 
strain of  literature to further the critical dimension of  the piece. 
The semantic origin of  the concept of  crisis can be traced back to the 
ancient Greek word krisis, referring to the doctor’s observation of  a disease’s decisive 
moment, in which the patient’s fate balances between life and death. Hypocrates’s 
(460 b.c. - 370 b.c.) first definition of  krisis illustrates a moment of  struggle in which 
an existential threat either substantiates or is withered away. More precisely, the word 
crisis refers to the decision of  the doctor. The word krisis finds its origins in the verb 
krino, that means to examine, to judge, to decide (Starn 1976). Diverse Greek authors 
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made the word spread to other fields, often without significant theoretical 
elaboration. Starn (1976, 6) points out that historians do not employ the word in any 
significant way until after the Renaissance. The definition of  crisis as a critical 
moment thus prevailed for centuries. 
The meanings of  the word expand between the XVIIth and the XIXth 
century, to depict breaking-points in a broader sense. The concept starts to refer to 
the dysfunctions of  a system, as economists and historians elaborate crisis theories. 
Marxism emerges as a critical theory claiming that crisis is inherent to capitalism 
(Ordioni 2011). Meanwhile, liberals were divided between Say and Keynes’ visions. 
Schumpeter’s thesis on the creative destruction caused by crises also became 
influential (Schumpeter 1942). All in all, the use of  the concept of  crisis boomed in 
the 20’s and 30’s of  the XX century. In all these meanings, the idea of  a turning point 
prevails (Graf  2010; Graf  & Föllmer 2012). 
What remains shared by both definitions is the reference to a risky and 
uncertain moment (Müller & Waterlot 2013). It invokes the notion of  perturbation, 
either seen as a moment of  decision or indecision (Morin 1976; Stegăroiu 2005). Still, 
the original semantic meaning of  the word is interesting as it includes the agency of  
an observer, capable of  integrating complex processes in a narrative structure to 
identify a point of  inflection (Graf  2010). In this line of  thought, Castoriadis insisted 
that ‘the crisis is the feeling of  crisis’, bringing to the fore the perception of  the crisis 
(Castoriadis 1980, 247). Still, how to identify real threats remain unclear, as no 
objective measurements can certify their existential character beforehand (Buzan et 
al. 1998; Žižek 2002). 
The 70’s mark a turning point for the concept of  crisis, that becomes a key 
element for the survival of  institutions. Modern governmental techniques conceal 
inequalities and legitimate oppressive policies invoking crisis narratives grounded on 
a logic of  confrontation with threats and enemies (Ordioni 2011; Krisis 2015). 
Neoliberalism turned the crisis into a device through which internal antagonism is 
created, concealed and neutralized (Cadahia 2012). The permanent threat is met with 
constant discretionality by the executives, in a repetitive attempt to shield referent 
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objects from annihilation. Permanent threats imply that responding to the illegitimacy 
stemming from allegedly preventive actions is postponed, as the enemy immediately 
reappears. 
 The eurozone is very peculiar with regard to this issue, as its constitutional 
configuration tends to generate securitization processes, in what Dyson (2013) has 
called a semi-permanent state of  emergency. Among other explanatory factors, what 
might be designated as the ordo-liberal ideology informing the blueprint of  the ECB 
is a significant one (Draghi 2013). The ECB stands as an unelected technocratic entity 
operating under a strict mandate of  price stability, defying the classic notion of  
sovereignty. Since the eurozone crisis, a growing body of  literature has dissected the 
so-called ‘German ideology’ (White 2015; Wigger, 2017). The lack of  solidarity 
shown by dominant countries of  the eurozone lacked an explanandum, as their 
dogmatism endangered the single currency – and thus, their own long-term structural 
interests (Debelle dos Santos 2017).  
Ordo-liberalism seeks to maintain an orderly economic system (Ordnung) 
which minimizes conflict between labor, business and the state (Midgley 2014). 
Economic constitutions are used to create a framework of  technical means for a 
stable market society, following a foundational moment that institutionalizes basic 
principles (White 2015). Laws, central banks, technocrats, boards, advisory 
committees and other entities negotiate the consensus underlying this rule-based 
economic system. Ordo-liberalism does not dismiss state action, although it 
constrains discretionality in conformity with the economic constitution. In practice, 
fiscal restraints and conditionality on financial support posited by ordo-liberalism 
have characterized the European architecture since its early days (Cozzolino & 
Giannone 2019). 
Paradoxically, the emphasis on a constitutional framework of  policy-making 
would seem to invite the escalation of  political rhetoric – a politics of  emergency – 
when interventions hard to qualify as ‘formal’ are pursued (White 2015). The 
following section traces the contours of  the crisis episode at hand, taking the 
aforementioned elements into account. Considering that ‘the crisis’ has become a 
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technology of  government, the narrative provided below attempts to identify a point 
of  inflection, to capture the growing feeling of  crisis, and to describe the salutary 
decision by the relevant authority, while acknowledging the concrete institutional 
framework which constrains the events. 
 
4. The culmination of  the Euro crisis 
This paper reads the global financial crisis as a turning point for class poli-
tics, with the kick-off  of  a new epoch of  accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 
2014). At first, the bankruptcy of  companies such as Goldman Sachs and Bear Sterns 
was deemed to be a threat to the stability of  the overall system, elevating those cor-
porations to the status of  ‘Too Big To Fail’ (Hudson 2010; Engle et al. 2015;). After 
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) in the US, bail-outs multiplied 
throughout the world. By November 2008, the EU had already spent over 4 billion 
in state funded interventions (La Caixa 2008). These measures revealed the financial 
fragilities caused by financialization (Lazzarato 2012).3 Yet, the indignation of  the 
population and the divisions caused within political parties were ignored (Rodrigo 
Mendizábal 2011; Hanan & Chaput 2013). Media narratives of  the crisis quickly de-
veloped to explain what became known as the Great Recession (Aalbers 2015). 
The first bail-outs followed a straightforward There Is No Alternative 
(TINA) argumentative strategy, achieving the short-term goal of  preventing eco-
nomic collapse (Debelle dos Santos 2013). Often limiting themselves to reduce un-
certainty, they operated more to restore trust than to make structural interventions 
(Hudson 2010). Then again, in the long term they ended up contributing to the eu-
rozone crisis, as they increased public debt. The European sovereign-debt crisis 
started in Greece in late 2010, as public debt turned out to be much higher than 
previously acknowledged. Greece’s difficulties can hardly be considered exceptional 
by themselves, as they are a direct consequence of  the structural imbalances within 
the Eurozone (Rakopoulos 2014). Yet, the Greek crisis can be seen as a catalytic 
 
3 Financialization consists in a process through which the indicators of  profitability and market capi-
talization obtain an increasing importance in states’ and companies’ strategies (Almiron Roig 2006). 
Galvão Debelle dos Santos, Draghi’s ‘Bumble Bee’ Challenges to Securitization Theory: a Comparative Anal-




moment during which the new regime of  governance of  the EU began to emerge 
(Kutter 2014). The collective agreement aimed to counter structural imbalances be-
tween member states amounted to deep-ranging austerity measures and coercive pol-
icies on debtors, without dispelling doubts about the solvency of  peripheral eurozone 
countries (Blyth 2013). Germany’s constitutional fiscal ‘debt-brake’ was exported to 
the rest of  the eurozone with disastrous consequences (Tooze 2018). 
Speculation over the default of  Italy and Spain was on the rise when, in May 
2012, Spain’s Prime Minister Rajoy negotiated a bail-out while publicly denying it. 
Rajoy’s statements came as a response to the bankruptcy of  Bankia, the state-owned 
‘bad bank’. During a first press conference Rajoy acknowledged that Bankia needed 
a capital injection, while rejecting the idea of  a bail-out to get funds for Bankia. Then, 
money was borrowed from the eurozone to rescue Spanish banks, while Rajoy 
claimed that it wasn’t a bail-out and that the credit would not compute to Spain’s debt. 
Rajoy’s statements caused confusion. The Eurogroup issued a statement clarifying 
that Spain was bound to repay the debt, interest, and enforce certain measures upon 
its banking system. By July 2012, financing costs for Italy and Spain peaked. Widening 
speculative pressures threatened the Euro itself. Indeed, while bailing out Spanish 
banks was still feasible, rescuing the fourth economy of  the Euro-zone was 
troublesome for the remaining partners of  the single currency (Soares 2012). 
It was not until late July that speculation went down again. ECB’s president 
Mario Draghi made unexpected statements about the institution’s policy at an 
investors conference in London. This discourse has been identified as the episode 
that ends the 2012 Euro crisis (Smith 2013; Holmes 2014; Braun 2016). Draghi’s 
statement that the ECB would do ‘whatever it takes’ to protect the Euro immediately 
reduced speculation. By then, the eurozone had agreed on the implementation of  the 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), a bond-buying program funded by member 
states. Even if  Germany’s green light was missing, discourse translated into material 
reality. The German parliament eventually returned from its summer break and 
approved the proposal. But the funds destined for the OMT were never used, as 
speculation was kept at bay long enough for other rescue mechanisms to take over.  
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It is worth underlining that the OMT program clashed with Article 123 of  
the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union, concerning the ‘no bailout 
clause’, thus making it highly controversial. In fact, it was preceded with the Market 
Securities Program, which could also be said to contravene the ECB’s ordo-liberal 
concern of  restraining from intervention beyond the creation of  a well-functioning 
order. Institutional arrangements for crisis management were then upgraded with the 
creation of  the European Stability (ESFM), later replaced by the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM). These entities have been granted a special status that locates them 
outside the EU founding treaties, while also superseding them. This also applies to 
the Fiscal Compact, which enforced greater fiscal controls over member states (White 
2015). This ‘ever closer union’ can be seen as a success only when overlooking the 
qualitative characteristic of  these integrative steps, often done under the cover of  
exceptionality. 
In 2014 the German Constitutional Tribunal would claim that the OMT 
program violated the constitutive norms of  the union. By presenting this claim to the 
EU Court of  Justice, it challenged Draghi’s move to counter the speculative spiral. 
The contentious episode came to an end in 2015. The judge ruled that the measures 
taken by the ECB – including the OMT – were constitutional. As the Advocate-Gen-
eral put it, the issue at stake was ‘to consider whether a programme such as OMT 
may be classified as a monetary policy measure or is, instead, an economic policy 
measure and, therefore, prohibited so far as the ECB is concerned’ (Villalón 2015, 
30). The statement clarified that ‘the OMT program belongs to the field of  monetary 
policies and is thus a part of  the competences of  the European System of  Central 
Banks’, besides also declaring that the OMT program is generally ‘compatible with 
Article 119 TFEU and Article 127(1) and (2) TFEU’ as well as with ‘Article 123(1) 
TFEU’ (Villalon 2015, 52). 
As stated in the document, the OMT programme was created ‘in response 
to a situation regarded as exceptional for the viability of  the ECB’s monetary policy’, 
while the precise context in which Draghi’s statement took place was one of  ‘inves-
tors’ lack of  confidence in whether the euro could survive’ (Villalon 2015, 4). The 
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general attorney conceded that the premium charged for the financing of  certain 
member states were excessive, favoring the interpretation that the ECB identified ex-
traordinary circumstances and acted to ‘reestablish the transmission mechanism of  
monetary policy’ (Villalon 2015, 16). As some authors pointed out, it might be due to 
the fact that the EU Court of  Justice chose not to confront EU-exceptionality alto-
gether (Kreuner Sonnen 2016). 
 
5. Critical Discourse Analysis 
This piece uses Critical Discourse Analysis to examine the selected sample, 
emphasizing the social meaning of  discourses, defined as the use of  language in social 
contexts (Giró Martí 1999; van Dijk 2006; Fairclough & Fairclough 2013). On a first 
level, discourse analysis studies meaning as part of  the social process (Fairclough 
2001). On a second level, discourse also refers to the language used in a certain field 
or social practice. Political discourse is an example of  this sort of  discourse. Finally, 
discourse also means a way of  constructing particular aspects of  the world from a 
specific social perspective. An example of  this is the ordo-liberal discourse on fiscal 
policy. In short, discourses are ways to represent and act upon certain aspects of  the 
world. 
Discourse analysis matters because language is simultaneously constitutive 
of  social identities and systems of  knowledge, representation and belief  related to 
the world (Pujante Sánchez & Morales López 2012). Discourse can reproduce these 
dimensions or contribute to transform them. Generally, discourses can be identified 
with postures or perspectives of  different social actors (Fairclough & Fairclough 
2013). Critical discourse analysts tend to study speech acts in concrete socio-historical 
contexts to critically assess their content (Jones & Collins 2006), discuss the dominant 
meanings that characterize them (Hall et al. 1978), and evaluate if  the claims they 
contain are true of  false, just or unjust (Fairclough 2001; Morales López 2013). 
Furthermore, securitization processes require the adherence of  the audience 
in order to successfully elevate certain issues to the realm of  security. As Vuori (2011, 
112) put it, ‘the question remains what is the relevant audience’. That is, not all 
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securitization discourses will be public on any level, and there could be various 
relevant audiences in a single securitization process. Anyhow, critical research 
highlighted that securitization is context-dependent, audience-centered and power-
laden (Balzacq 2005). In the case study at hand, price signals’ capacity to present a 
kind of  universal evidence that insulates itself  from negotiation illustrates well the 
effects of  context on securitization moves. This article puts emphasis on market 
audience, which has the particularity of  not being defined by entering into a 
relationship of  co-constitution of  a collectivity (Langenohl 2017). 
Indeed, it matters to underscore that ‘sovereign debt ratings, as their name 
does not suggest, fully rely on the obligation market, and thus from international 
financial investors’ (Lordon 2019,174). Markets set benchmarks for the intensity of  
threats, leaving little ground to deny the urgency of  the situation. More broadly, 
economic developments are deeply tied to the elemental forces of  opinion and beliefs 
(Lordon 2007). While economies correspond to material events, they are always 
mediated by discursive and extra-discursive forces (Hanan 2010). The strong market 
impact of  politicians and central bankers’ statements shows discourses are a crucial 
part of  the economy (Bligh & Hess 2007; Perrone 2010). 
The complex interrelationships between finance and security are a key 
feature of  the eurozone crisis. According to Langenohl (2017, 140), the fast-paced 
integration steps led by crisis-management amount to an ‘institutionalized 
supranational securitization’. It also implied ‘macro-securitization’, as member-states 
securitizations aligned with supranational ones. Finally, and against the reading of  an 
all-encompassing ‘deep securitization’, protest movements and disruptive political 
parties performed significant counter-securitizing moves (Abulof  2014; Bruff  2014; 
Oberndorfer 2020). The present piece aims to provide greater detail on eurozone 
exceptionality by showing how the selected discourses fit the concept of  
securitization. As such, CDA’s traditional focus on the rhetorical tricks used to 
increase the effectiveness of  the texts is subsidiary to the present analysis. 
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This paper focuses on the speech given by Rajoy on June 10th, and on 
Draghi’s speech, that took place on July 26th.4 Thus, I focus on two crucial levels: the 
central bank of  the single currency and the main political leader of  Spain. These 
primary texts of  the sample are complemented by an analysis of  how newspapers 
recontextualized these discourses. This multi-level approach has shown useful to 
tackle the complexity of  discourses about EU institutions (Kutter 2015). In other 
words, I look first at the discourse of  the main political leaders involved and then at 
the editorial reactions of  four reference newspapers. Both interventions correspond 
to high points of  media visibility, understood as the occurrence of  a certain ac-
tor/topic in the media (Kantner et al. 2008). 
The newspapers under scrutiny are the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), the Financial 
Times (FT), Le Monde and El País. The first newspapers specialize in finance reporting, 
while the latter are generalist newspapers. All of  them are prestigious, renowned and 
influential political actors at the international level (van Dijk 2006). The sample is 
thus diverse in geographical terms, including newspapers from the US, the UK, 
France and Spain respectively. These newspapers were selected due to their loose 
correspondence to different monetary authorities: the WSJ with the dollar, the FT 
with the pound, Le Monde with the euro. El País allows us to have a perspective from 
the country being bailed-out. The case study’s relevance allowed for a synchronous 









4 Rajoy’s first speech, made by on May 27th, would deserve to be analyzed separately, as all the important 
information is provided as responses to journalists’ questions at the end of  his speech. 
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Table 1 - Eurozone crisis sample 





Rajoy - June 10th 










Du bon usage de la 
crise financière 
européenne 
 Euro blame 
game 
Draghi – July 26th 
07/25   
Spain blames 
Mario  






07/28    
The ECB talks 
tough on the 
euro  
08/01   The music men  
 Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Table 1 shows in gray the selection of  nine editorials, chosen as close as 
possible to the discourses of  the political representatives. Three editorials were 
needed to provide a complete analysis of  the WSJ. For reasons I thoroughly discuss 
below, this newspaper only comments on Draghi’s statements almost two weeks later. 
The texts of  the sample were analyzed on two levels. First, by the means of  a micro 
analysis, using tools from the field of  pragmatics (Giró Martí 1999; Richardson 2006). 
Then, each text was processed using tools from the field of  argumentation theory. 
Having highlighted the implicit messages at the micro level, I proceeded to reorganize 
its most relevant aspects using Fairclough and Fairclough (2013) diagram. 
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6. Threat assessment and management 
Before moving on to the theoretical discussion, the threat assessment of  
each political actor is first summed up for the reader. The following sub-sections are 
thus eminently descriptive and aim to provide a clear reading of  each actor’s position. 
A brief  discussion at the end of  each sub-section assesses the discourses’ 
correspondence to the concept of  securitization. 
 
6.1. Rajoy and Draghi denial strategies 
Starting with Madrid’s announcement of  the bail-out, one finds many details 
about Rajoy’s own policies and the claim that the bail-out is a positive outcome of  
these. Rajoy claims that ‘what was achieved yesterday’ is a success due to the three 
tools employed by his government: the ‘purification of  public accounts’, ‘structural 
reforms’ and the ‘restructuring of  the financial system’. Conversely, the underlying 
problems would be an excessive deficit and debt, and a lack of  economic 
competitiveness. According to him, ‘if  we had not done what we did during these five 
months what would have been discussed yesterday would be the rescue of  the 
Spanish Kingdom, and, as we have been doing our homework, what was settled 
yesterday was a credit line for our banking system’. Rajoy concludes that ‘the 
economic situation was and is still very delicate, and we’re obliged to make a great 
effort to clean up our debt, that is huge, both the public and the private one’. In short, 
Rajoy diverts attention towards his own measures while denying the consequences of  
the European bank bail-out. 
On the contrary, Draghi addressed fears head-on. An introductory 
metaphor is used to compare the Euro to a bumblebee, that ‘shouldn’t fly but instead 
it does.’ He then makes a technical assessment of  the arguments that are being put 
forward about ‘the fragility of  the Euro … and maybe the crisis of  the Euro’. Against 
those voices, Draghi claims that the Euro ‘is much, much stronger than what people 
make of  it today’ and compares the eurozone with the US and Japan in terms of  
inflation, employment, productivity, deficit and debt. He considers that this 
comparison is favorable to the eurozone and underscores that ‘extraordinary progress 
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has been made during the last six months’ in terms of  ‘deficit control and structural 
reforms’. Draghi insists that member states count on levels of  social cohesion absent 
in the US and Japan, and adds that this ‘is a very important ingredient for undertaking 
all the structural reforms that will actually graduate the bumblebee into a real bee’. 
Having debunked the critiques to the Euro, Draghi then makes his central claim: 
‘Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. 
And believe me, it will be enough.’ After that, Draghi shares some of  the problems 
the ECB is tackling, such as financial fragmentation and risk aversion, and clarifies 
what falls within the mandate of  the ECB.  
These two discursive events had a great impact on market pressures. Rajoy’s 
confusing claims furthered the acute bond market crisis, bringing it closer to the point 
of  no-return. Draghi’s discourse had significant performative effects, establishing the 
anchoring monetary authority that the eurozone had hitherto lacked (Searle 2002; 
Tooze 2018). Far from suggesting that speculation was ‘not real’, these threat 
management strategies illustrate the weight of  trust for monetary and financial 
institutions. On the one hand, the mild results of  Rajoy’s denial strategy and Draghi’s 
strong statements are in line with CS’s claim that language is crucial to the constitution 
of  security (Hansen 2011, 2012). Yet, the impact of  these two discursive events is 
partly due to unuttered actions. The incongruousness between discourse and practice 
seems to have had a weight of  their own, thus requiring going beyond text analysis. 
Interestingly, Rajoy and Draghi denied (existential) threats requiring excep-
tional measures. Both European leaders provided many technical details about the 
economic situation and the necessary character of  the austerity measures. European 
leaders stated that the Euro is an irreversible project, that austerity is necessary and 
that the population (in the case of  Rajoy) and the governments (in the case of  Draghi) 
must understand that these obligations are not negotiable. While these discourses’ 
explicit willingness to comply with the rules have a depoliticizing effect, the clearly 
exceptional character of  their actions returns us to the issue of  sovereignty. Could it 
be, then, that Rajoy and Draghi were trying to desecuritize the Euro crisis, as they denied 
the threat and the need for further exceptional measures? 
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6.2. Newspapers’ editorial responses 
The Spanish bail-out and Draghi’s statements generated considerable 
discursive complexity in newspapers coverage, as political representatives’ claims of  
normality failed to match their exceptional practices. The first newspaper I will look 
at is El País. This journal claims that ‘Rajoy denies the bail-out’, while pointing out 
his uncontrollable and unpredictable attitude. The editorial identifies the 
contradictions in which Rajoy got tangled, in what the journal considers to be a ‘stark 
display of  political realism’. In short, the newspaper directs its criticism to the way 
Rajoy accepted the bail-out, not the bail-out itself. The editorial published after 
Draghi’s intervention is more optimistic. El País says that Draghi’s ‘magic words’ have 
offered ‘the break that Spain and Italy were asking for’. But these magic words need 
to be met with actions, and ‘Spain must apply the demanded reforms correctly to 
avoid a state rescue’. For El País, the threat is still looming. Draghi’s ‘verbal 
intervention’ and the bail-out are seen as good news, but they are not sufficient to 
overcome the threat of  default.  
While El País focuses on Spain’s policies, Le Monde directs its attention 
towards European politics. Just like El País, Le Monde makes a detailed criticism of  
Rajoy’s attitude and of  his denial of  Spanish banking sector’s ‘pitiful condition’. This 
is seen as problematic because ‘it could destabilize the whole eurozone’, but also 
because member states ‘take advantage of  the Euro’ endangering the eurozone. Le 
Monde concludes that ‘communitarian banking supervision is necessary’. After 
Draghi’s discourse, Le Monde criticizes European politicians for their incompetence, 
as ‘cacophony reigns where there should be strong coordination’. Due to this political 
debacle, ‘stock markets are going down everywhere, risk premiums on Spanish and 
Italian bonds are skyrocketing (…)’. Although Draghi praised member states’ efforts 
in his speech, Le Monde surprisingly fails to reconstitute his statements, and claims 
that the president of  the ECB ‘is one thousand times right when he also diagnoses 
that the 17 [member states] are not doing their job’. 
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Moving on to specialized newspapers, one finds devastating comments. The 
FT finds Spanish situation critical and argues that ‘states and banks remain in their 
lethal embrace’. The journal considers that Spain was rewarded with favorable 
conditions for its ‘genuine commitment to austerity and structural reform’, but the 
rescue could make things worse ‘if  the state of  Spanish banks is much worse than 
expected’. The editorial proposes to ‘cap taxpayer exposure’ and concludes that 
‘protecting the banks themselves only prolongs the problem’. In its second editorial, 
the FT describes Draghi’s magic words as ‘the financial equivalent’ of  Dirty Harry’s 
‘make my day’ scene, in which Clint Eastwood defies a thug to test him. Just like El 
Pais, the FT claims that Draghi’s words must translate into action, otherwise ‘his bluff  
will soon be called’. Several solutions are discussed to end up concluding that ‘the 
ESM is superior to direct ECB bond-buying’. In short, the FT broadly agrees with El 
País on the positive nature of  the bail-out, but adds that banks must take a hit. 
Regarding European politics, the FT agrees with Le Monde that eurozone institutions 
should be empowered, but analyzes the pros and cons with technical factors, instead 
of  the moral ones employed by Le Monde. 
As for the WSJ, Spain’s rescue amounts to a ‘self-bailout for the rest of  
Europe’, that is still carrying the burden of  the ‘original sin’ of  Greece’s bail-out. The 
good news is that Madrid avoided a ‘sovereign bailout’ and obtained ‘more favorable 
terms than other countries’ both in terms of  interest rates and conditionality. 
However, Spain must ‘use the money and time for a thorough financial house-
cleaning and wider reform’. Then, just before Draghi’s discourse, the WSJ publishes 
an editorial echoing the statements of  Spain’s Minister of  Economy. Using irony and 
sarcasm, the WSJ suggests that Luis de Guindos is an idiot, as he would be using 
Monty Python’s ‘nudge nudge wink wink’ strategy to relate with EU institutions. The 
editorial also criticizes Rajoy's denial of  Spain's economic problems, and supports 
Draghi’s refusal to act ‘as a crutch for ineffective national governments’. Again, 
further austerity measures are needed, otherwise ‘Spain will soon be back to Brussels 
with the begging bowl’. Finally, Draghi’s statements obliged the WSJ to provide a 
more nuanced position. The last editorial compares central bankers with the ‘Music 
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Men’, in reference to a movie in which a group of  con men fool the population of  a 
small village. The general message is that ‘The residents of  River City were fooled by 
Harold Hill because they wanted to be’, meaning that everyone is ‘putting so much 
faith in the magical powers of  central bankers’. In other words, the WSJ refuses to 
believe that Draghi’s statements solved the problem, making it the only journal of  the 
sample which thoroughly criticizes Draghi. The WSJ shares Le Monde’s criticism of  
troubled member states, but puts more emphasis on the need for structural reforms. 
The critique of  the bail-out is made on ideological terms, while El País criticisms 
focus on concrete elements, such as Rajoy’s contradictions. Both the WSJ and the FT 
argue in favor of  austerity, but the WSJ insists further on the fact that this is the only 
realist solution on the table.  
To sum up, no newspaper makes a critical assessment of  finance’s responsi-
bility in creating the threat in the first place. The unambiguous criticism of  politicians 
by the WSJ and Le Monde, and the heavy criticisms of  Rajoy by the FT and El País 
indicate that newspapers added pressure on the political system in order to have the 
bail-outs approved. Hand in hand with the bail-out, all journals identify structural 
reforms as measures to which there is no alternative in order to avoid a sovereign 
debt bail-out. In fact, all newspapers support Rajoy’s willingness to conduct austerity 
measures before the bail-out. Still, they were critical of  Spain’s bail-out, and made a 
complex technical assessment of  available alternatives. Specialized newspapers 
pointed out that the economic situation could worsen if  the money was not used 
wisely. These newspapers provide two ways of  interpreting how Draghi handled the 
threat. The FT sees Draghi as Dirty Harry pointing his gun to a thug, while the WSJ 
considers that central bankers are Music Men, conning a public eager to be fooled. 
Both consider that the threat is still looming, as central bankers are either seen as 
sweet-talking investors into believing a lie or as defying them. On the contrary, gen-
eralist newspapers fail to discuss supranational interests, and limit their criticism to 
nation-states’ representatives. 
In line with CS’s framework of  analysis, threat production is here at full 
throttle: journals tried to securitize the issue pressing for extraordinary measures. In 
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fact, while Rajoy and Draghi denied and downplayed the threat, journals contributed 
to amplify it until Draghi’s speech, after which they moderated their anxieties. 
 
7. Undeclared exceptionalism and sovereignty struggles 
As we’ve seen, the interplay between a eurozone member state (Spain), the 
relevant monetary authority (ECB) and the four newspapers under study (WSJ, FT, 
Le Monde, El Pais) is complex.  
Against the Schmittian fixation on state sovereignty, exceptionalism has 
shown to be located at several levels of  political authority (Hanrieder & Kreuder-
Sonnen 2014). Until Draghi intervened, emergency Europe was defined not by a sin-
gle authority, but by the absence of  any single authority (White 2015). It could be 
tempting to conclude that the eurozone crisis was halted by the ECB’s political mes-
sage. The ECB finally proved willing to deploy unrestricted firepower to curb finan-
cial unrest, as the enthusiasm of  most newspapers confirms. But, as Tooze (2018, 
438) puts it, saying that Draghi’s ‘whatever it takes’ solved the crisis is a retrospective 
construction. The struggle over the direction of  ECB policy that had begun in 2010 
would not end with Draghi’s speech.  
This reading has the advantage of  bringing our attention back to member 
state politics. While Langenohl (2017, 141) concludes that eurozone securitization 
processes consisted in ‘the struggle over the question of  whether single nation-states 
can be allowed to perform legitimate audienceship to supranational securitizing 
moves’5, it seems that the struggle was about which nation-states dispose of  this ca-
pacity. Germany’s formal and informal vetoes weaken the reading of  Draghi’s state-
ments as those of  ‘Europe’s sovereign’. Furthermore, Spain’s role should be given 
more attention, as Rajoy’s refusal to bow his head was the equivalent of  playing the 
‘game of  chicken’ with stronger eurozone partners. 
By acting extraordinarily, Rajoy and Draghi respectively managed to obtain 
preferential treatment for the bail-out and to put an end to speculation on the Euro. 
Rajoy’s refusal to take the bail-out amounted to a defensive move against finance and 
 
5 Italics added. 
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eurozone interference. While investors saw through the preposterous claims made by 
the prime-minister, it remains that Rajoy managed to use the collective risk implied 
by Spain’s default to nibble a preferential treatment for the bail-out. Something similar 
can be said about Draghi, as he refuted the arguments against the single currency’s 
stability. Their actions implied a fair amount of  conflict with countries obtaining 
structural benefits from the Euro, namely Germany. 
It has been noted that the need to maintain internal stability can make state 
authorities adopt a hostile stance towards foreign countries and capital, supra-national 
organizations, etc. (Ong 2008). Rajoy and Draghi accommodated authoritarian pro-
market arguments with conflictive actions against the dominant interests within the 
eurozone. They seem simultaneously favorable to the free market while acting against 
speculative pressures; in favor of  European fiscal restraints and against short term 
interests of  the dominant countries of  the eurozone. The results thus illustrate that 
benefiting from transnational capital flows relies on accommodating neo-liberal and 
authoritarian policies (Fotopoulos 1997; Ong 2006, 2008, 2012). 
Rajoy and Draghi’s authoritarianism suggest the need to adopt a nuanced 
stance on (de)securitization, as the clearly exceptional nature of  political representa-
tives’ actions clashes with the classic definition of  the CS. Critical securitization stud-
ies show that it remains a relevant and useful framework when studying authoritarian 
or totalitarian contexts (Vuori 2008). Here, it allowed to illustrate how the eurozone 
tendency to generate states of  economic exception unfolds in practice. With the eu-
rozone crisis, the tension between tight budgetary restraints and executive-led action 
was brought to its paroxysm. Interestingly, parliamentary restrictions often come 
hand in hand with expanding executive discretion (Giannone 2015). All in all, the 
Euro crisis appears less as a moment of  classic exceptionality – where a return to 
normality is expected – than a new founding moment (White 2015). 
What required extraordinary procedures before the Euro crisis now stands 
as a mechanic response, generating the difficulty of  studying a paradoxical ‘normal-
ized exception’. This paradigm change has serious implications in terms of  discourse 
studies, as some securitizating moves stop being verbalized as the CS theorized them 
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(Huysmans 2011). Although securitization studies were useful to expose the complex 
interplay between the different scales composing the eurozone crisis, they become 
rather limited to make sense of  the results by themselves. 
The authoritarian component of  political representatives’ discourses re-
ceived the full support of  newspapers, suggesting the need to look further into the 
working of  contemporary forms of  exceptionality. As classic securitizating actors, all 
newspapers first pressed for a bail-out and then applauded Draghi’s move. More gen-
erally, the media joined in on the consensus about debt and austerity, which continue 
to cause widespread misery across Europe (Clua-Losada & Horn 2014). The media 
paved the way for exceptionality, providing preemptive support to political action 
lacking the backing of  parliamentary instances. By making the audience crave and 
applaud pre-made technocratic arrangements, media debates became the circumstan-
tial substitute to ‘politics as normal’. 
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